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DICTA

Claims By and Against the Government Resulting
from War Department Activity t
By

CLIFFORD

L.

ASHTON*

Experience in claims offices of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
of the United States Army, has convinced the writer that many lawyers do
not have a full appreciation of the existing rights and remedies which are
provided for the relief of those who have been damaged by government
activity, particularly activity of military and civilian personnel of the War
Department. Several cases have come to the writer's attention of individuals
who have been advised by counsel that they had no legal remedy against the
government for damage and injuries sustained because of the general rule
of sovereign immunity from suit. While this is true, it does not follow that
an injured party cannot make claim against the government, nor that such
claims cannot be paid. Congress has made many inroads into the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by providing claims statutes authorizing various departments of the government to settle certain claims.' This legislation has probthe acts of government agents.
The purpose of this article is as follows: First, to outline briefly the
remedy and procedure provided by the Act of 3 July 1943, as amended by
2
the Act of 29 May 1945, commonly referred to as the Domestic Claims Act.

Second, to consider briefly the legislative relief available to damaged claimants through special relief bills presented at each session of the Congress.
Third, to review the policy and legal procedure involved in processing and
prosecuting claims which the government has against those whose negligent
acts have caused damage to government property and personnel.
I. Domestic Claims Act

The Act of 3 July 1943, as amended, commonly referred to as the
tReprinted by permission from the Utah Bar Bulletin, Jan.-Feb., 1946.
*Judge, City Court, Salt Lake City.
Various bills making the Federal government generally responsible for the negligence of its officers or employees have been introduced in Congress since 1925. Separate
bills passed both houses as early as the 69th Congress. The Federal Torts Bill, sponsored
by the American Bar Association and indorsed in principle by President Roosevelt in
his message to the 77th Congress passed the Senate but was not acted upon by the
House. The bill was reintroduced in the 78th Congress but did not pass. It is apparent
that the trend is away from sovereign immunity, and that in the near future the government will accept full responsibility for the torts of its officers and employees.

ably been enacted to relieve the Congress of the burden of a great number
of special relief bills which have been requested by individuals damaged by
2 57 Stat. 372; 31 U.S.C. 223b as amended by Public Law 67-79th Cong.; sec.
III, War Department Bulletin 9, 1945.
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Domestic Claims Act, confers authority on the War Department 3 to process
of the War Department acting within the scope of their employment. 4 Liability is limited to $1,000.00 in time of war and $500.00 in time of peace,
and extends to damage to, or loss or destruction of both real and personal
property., Q Liability for personal injury is restricted to reasonable medical,
hospital, and burial expense actually incurred. It does not include liability
for physical pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity recoverable in
ordinary tort actions.
Under the provisions of the act, claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property, or for personal injury or death, proximately caused by willful, negligent, wrongful, or otherwise tortious acts or omissions of military
personnel or civilian employees acting within the scope of their employment
are payable. Acts or omissions involving a lack of reasonable care are the
usual basis of claims so payable. However, the claimant must not be at fault
himself. If his negligent or wrongful act in any way proximately contributed
to his injury or damage his claim will be denied.
Claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property, or for personal
injury or death, though not caused by acts or omissions of military personnel
or civilian employees of the War Department or of the army, are payable
under the provisions of the Act of 3 July 1943, as amended, if otherwise
incident to the non-combat activities of the War Department or of the army.
In general, the claims within the above category are those arising out of
authorized activities which are peculiarly army activities having little parallel
' The War Department has implemented the Act of 3 July 1943 and 29 May 1945,
supra, by Army Regulation 25-25, dated 3 July 1943 and 29 May 1945 and Army
Regulations 25-20, dated 3 July 1943 and 29 May. Copies of these Army Regulations
may be obtained by writing to the Office of the Adjutant General in Washington.

and pay for certain damages caused by military personnel or civilian empolyees
4Although officers and enlisted men are not strictly speaking, servants or employees of the government, they are so considered for the purpose of determining liability under the Domestic Claims Act.
"The exact hour which has been fixed upon for the outbreak of the war with Japan
is 1:25 p.m., E.S.T., 7 Dec. 1941, Sec. III, Cir. 118, W.D., 23 April 1942. The Judge
Advocate General has frequently held that a state of war continues until a formal peace
treaty has been signed. Therefore, until such a peace treaty has been signed, the jurisdictional limit recoverable under the Domestic Claims Act is $1,000.00.
'While the Secretary of War does not have authority to settle claims over
$1,000.00 the act does authorize him to report to Congress claims over the applicable
limit. The Army Regulation which implements the act provides that such claims will
be forwalded to the Judge General for appropriate action. The Judge Advocate General,-if he considers the claim meritorious prepares a recommendation for the signature
of the Undersecretary of War which is transmitted to the Bureau and thence to the
Claims Committee of Congress. If Congress approves, which it usually does, the claim
is included in the next annual or deficiency appropriation act. It is important to note
that a claim made through the War Department, even though over the jurisdictional
amount, will not include elements to conpensate for loss of wages, pain and suffering,
permanent disability and death. (Army Regulation 25-25, 29 May 1945.) This limitation imposed by the Army Regulation does not apply to special relief bills, hereinafter
considered, which are requested by direct means through the Congress.
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in civilian pursuits and to situations which historically have been considered
as furnishing a proper basis for the payment of claims. For example, included
are claims for damage or injury arising out of, and which are natural or
probable results or incidents of, maneuvers and special field exercises, practice
firing of heavy guns, practice bombing, opjeration of aircraft and antiaircraft,
use of barrage balloons, escape of horses, use of instrumentalities having
latent mechanical defects not traceable to negligent acts or omissions, movement of combat vehicles or other vehicles designed especially for military
use, and use and occupancy of real estate. Negligence or wrongful act of
the claimant, in whole or in part the proximate cause, bars a claim.
The War Department rule which denies recovery to a claimant whose
negligence contributes to his injury or damage is so firmly established that
the Judge Advocate General has refused to accept any of the rules applied
in some jurisdictions which relax the established policy. Thus the doctrines
of comparative negligence and last clear chance are not applied under the
Domestic Claims Act.
Frequently a conflict of law question will arise. By analogy to the reasoning applied in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the Judge Advocate
General has held that, in the absence of Federal law, the law of the situs
controls. Thus the "family purpose doctrine" will be applied if the claim
arose in a jurisdiction which follows that rule. So also, if the jurisdiction
imputes the negligence of one driving to the owner, irrespective of a master
servant relationship, the rule will be applied in passing on the contributory
negligence of the claimant.
Claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property must be presented by the owner of the property or his duly authorized agent or legal
representative. The word Towner", as so used, includes bailees, lessees, mortgagors and conditional vendees, but does not include mortgagees, conditional
vendors and others, having title for purposes of security only. Claims for
personal injury or death must be presented by the injured person or his duly
authorized agent or legal representative. Claims for medical, hospital and
burial expenses, not presented by the injured person, may, if it appears that
no legal representative has been appointed, be presented by any person who,
by reason of family relationship, has in fact incurred the expenses for which
claim is made.
Under the 1943 act military personnel and employees of the War Department could not tecover if their injury or damage occurred incident to their
service. Thus, if a soldier's automobile were damaged by a government vehicle
he could not, under the old act, recover from the government unless he could
show that he was engaged in a private matter, not incident to his service in
the army. This limitation has been removed by the present act so that now
army and War Department personnel have the same rights as other claimants.
The act provides that claims must be presented in writing within one
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year from the date of their accrual. However, if the incident giving rise to
the claim occurs in time of 'war, or if war intervenes within one year, the
claim, on good cause shown, may be presented until one year after peace is
established. The burden is on claimant to show good cause why his claim
was not presented within the year. Proof must be substantial, such as absence
from the country or military service, or an honest and reasonable belief that
all steps necessary have been taken.
Motor vehicle accidents are the greatest single source of claims under
the Domestic Claims Act. Frequently the owner of the property involved
in such an accident has a contract of insurance which provides subrogation
rights to the insurance company. The question that therefore arises is: What
are the rights of a subrogee insurance company under the Domestic Claims
Act? The right of subrogation was never recognized in connection with army
claims until 1932 when the Attorney General held that the right should be
recognized with respect to claims under the old negligence act.7 But under
the present act, here considered, a subrogee has no rights in that capacity
because the act specifically provides that only the insured or his agent will be
recognized by the government. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
splitting of claims with attendant administrative difficulties and possibility
of duplicate payment. The full amount, therefore, is paid to the insured or
his agent, regardless of whether a portion of the recovered sum may be recovered from the insured by his insurance company. The practical effect of this
rule is that the insurance companies make claim for the insured in insured's
name, as his agent, provided such agency is established.by a written power
of attorney or other writing evidencing an agency. This practice is common
and the War Department has no rule or policy which opposes its continuance.
Lawyers who advise and represent clients who have claims against the
government are, of course, interested in the procedure employed and the
policy which guides the administrative handling of such matters. The procedure is as follows:
When an accident .or incident occurs which results in damage to private
property, regardless of amount, or death or personal injury to a civilian,
except those covered by provisions of the United States Employees Compensation Act, an investigation is made. Every post, camp, or station has a claims
officer who has the responsibility of making these investigations. The primary
purpose is to develop information necessary to determine whether or not a
claim will be allowed by the government, or to determine whether or not a
claim exists in favor of the government. This information, which includes
required diagrams and exhibits, is compiled into a report. During the investigation the officer will ordinarily advise the damaged party of his right to
file a claim and will furnish the necessary forms and information required.
This will be done even though the officer may feel that the claimant is not
' 36 Atty. General 553.
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entitled to recover. The claims officer will forward his report, together with
his recommendation and claimant's claim, if one has been filed, to the commanding officer who appointed him. This commanding officer either approves
or disapproves the recommendation. If he does not have delegated authority
to settle the claim, which is the usual case, he forwards the original and one
copy of the report and claim to the commanding general of the service com*mand or the commanding officer of the air service command, depending on
which branch of the service is involved. At this point the evidence and recommendations are again reviewed by trained army officers in the commanding
general's judge advocate office. They write a review in which an approval
or disapproval is recommended. The review is placed on the commanding
general's desk for his action. His action will usually follow the recommendation of his claims judge advocate.
If he orders approval and payment, the claim is sent to the appropriate
disbursing officer for payment. If he disapproves the claim, in whole or in
part, the claimant is notified in writing of his right to appeal within 30 days
to the Secretary of War. If an appeal is filed within 30 days it is forwarded,
together with the complete record, to the Office of The Judge Advocate General in Washington. There the appeal is transferred to the claims division
where a recommendation is made. From there the file is sent to the Secretary
of War for his final action. His action will generally follow the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General. After action on the appeal by the
Secretary of War the claimant is notified. If the claim is finally approved
in less than the full amount, consent of the claimant to accept the lesser amount
approved must be obtained.
If no claim is filed with the investigating officer he forwards the original
and one copy of his report, through the channels herein indicated, to the office
of the claims judge advocate of the service command, or air service command,
where it is kept on record pending the filing of a claim.
The policy developed by the War Department in the payment of claims
under this act is an extremely liberal one. It is demonstrated in the opinions
of The Attorney General, The Comptroller General, The Judge Advocate
General, and other policy forming officials. It is also demonstrated in army
regulations and in general procedural and administrative War Department
practice.
Lawyers, accustomed to ordinary rules of causation and negligence, may
find the government's willingness to pay claims by liberal causation interpretation and without primary negligence somewhat startling. They will also
find that the ordinary "arms length" attitude developed by litigants in the
usual tort case does not exist between the government and a claimant; in fact
the claims officer is often so anxious to assist a damaged party in obtaining
every benefit provided in the act that his conduct is more apt to resemble that
of claimant's advocate than that of a government investigator. One reason

DICTA
for this is the remote and impersonal responsibility which many army officers,
like other public officials, sometimes feel toward the public treasury.
II. Legislative Relief
As herein indicated, one of the principle reasons for the enactment of
claims statutes is to relieve the Congress of the burden placed on it by special
bills for relief submitted by congressmen in behalf of constituents who have
suffered damage by reason of government activity. But this means of redress
is not removed by the enactment of claims statutes. It is a very effectual
remedy that still exists, and one that is frequently overlooked.
In considering this remedy it is important to distinguish it from the remedy provided in the Domestic Claims Act itself, particularly the provision
which enables the Secretary of War, acting through the Judge Advocate
General, to report to Congress for approval claims filed under the act which
are over $1,000.00. (See note 6.) Such claims, while not restricted in amount
are restricted as to the nature of the damage which may be recovered. Thus,
under a claim so filed damages occasioned by pain and suffering, loss of wages,
and permanent disability or death, are not allowable and will not be presented
to Congress by the War Department. This is because of the restriction in
the army regulation which implements the statute and which also provides a
legislative remedy.
If a claim is presented directly to Congress by means of a special relief
bill initiated by claimant's senator or representative none of the restrictions
contained in the army regulation apply. Damages payable by this method
are unlimited in nature and amount.
Suppose two hypothetical situations: First, a claimant's $2,000.00 automobile has been demolished in a collision with an army vehicle without any
fault on the part of claimant. Second, same facts, except that not only has
his automobile been damaged, he has been severely and permanently injured.
What is his remedy in each instance?
In the first case claimant has an adequate remedy provided by the Domestic Claims Act as implemented by Army Regulations 25-25. His claim is
entirely for property damage. Even though the amount is in excess of that
which the War Department may pay, The Judge Advocate General is authorized to prepare a recommendation for the signature of the Undersecretary
of War which will eventually be approved by the Claims Committee of
Congress. By this method claimant will receive the full amount of his damage
in the next deficiency appropriation act.
In the second case claimant can recover no more than $2,000.00 from
Congress if he initiates his claim with the War Department. Clearly this will
not compensate him for the injury he has sustained by reason of pain and
suffering, loss of wages, and permanent injury. Therefore claimant must look

202
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elsewhere for a remedy. He can obtain adequate relief by proceeding as
follows:
A letter is written to claimant's representative or senator requesting that
a special relief bill be submitted to Congress. There is no limit to the amount
which may be requested and no restriction on the nature of the damages which
may be recovered. After the bill has been submitted it is referred to the
Claims Committee of the Congress This committee refers it to the government agency which allegedly caused the injury or damage. If the damage
resulted from War Department activity it will be referred through the War
Department to The Judge Advocate General's Office in Washington. From
there it will be forwarded to the claims officer located in the area which the
alleged accident or incident occurred. The claims officer will make the usual
investigation and report, which report together with his recommendation, will
be forwarded to the service command headquarters where it will be reviewed
by the service command claims judge advocate. If necessary, additional investigation will be made.
After the completed file is returned to The Judge Advocate General's
Office in Washington the claims division of that office will review the evidence
and recommendations and request any further information which may be
required. Finally the reviewing officer will recommend that the claim be
approved in whole or in part, or that it be denied. This recommendation,
together with the review, will be sent to the Claims Committee where, for
all practical purposes, final action will be taken. In almost every case the
recommendation of The Judge Advocate General's Office is approved. As
a practical matter, therefore, it is important to understand the rules and
policy which guide that office in determining government liability.
Officers in The Judge Advocate Department are lawyers. Most of them
are well trained. Many have had considerable practical legal experience. It
is these men who review the evidence and apply the law upon which the claim
is determined. The law which they apply, under the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, supra, is the law of the situs. This law,
as every lawyer knows, consists of the ordinary rules evolved 'by the local
courts and established by statutes and ordinances in effect in the jurisdiction.
For this reason it is quite possible to advise a client who is seeking relief by
means of a special relief bill that his claim will be determined by the same
legal rules which would be applied by the local courts. The principle difference is that the method -employed is legislative rather than judicial.
It will be noted that the limitation imposed in the Domestic Claims Act,
specifically that which restricts damages in personal injury cases to actual
medical, hospital, and burial expense, does not apply under the legislative
remedy just considered.
It is important to point out that if a claimant has an adequate remedy
under the Domestic Claims Act, legislative relief by means of a special relief
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bill will be denied. The remedy will be considered adequate if the amount
claimed is less than the maximum sum payable under the Act.

M.

Claims by the Government

The government in exercising its inherent right to recover for damages
to government property in the custody or control of the War Department
or of the army, or for loss incurred by reason of the torts of third persons
proceeds in accordance with Army Regulation 25-220, 29 May 1945.8 This
regulation provides the procedure and scope for War Department claims.
Included within the provisions of the regulation are claims in excess of
$25.00, and claims in lesser amount when the assertion thereof is deemed in
the interest of the government. Included are the following: Damage to or
loss or destruction of government property; amount of pay and -allowances
paid or payable by the government to military personnel for any period of
incapacitation incident to injury to such personnel caused by negligent third
parties; cost of medical treatment, hospitalization, travel, or other expense
or loss to the government, in the rehabilitation of military personnel incident
to injury; cost of funeral, burial, transportation, or other expense or loss to
the government, incident to death of military personnel; expense to the government incurred in other cases, arising from negligence or wrongful act,
where the government's obligation is fixed by common law, federal or state
statute, convention, treaty, or agreement.
Generally speaking, it will be observed that the regulation includes those
elements of damage which could be collected by a private person for damage
to his property and those which could be collected by an employer for injury
to his employee. Claims resulting from personal injuries to civilian personnel
in the War Department are not considered under the regulation. They are
handled under the. United States Employees Compensation Act.9
In asserting claims under the regulation .the government, in recognition
of Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, supra, concedes, in the absence of federal law,
that the law of the situs determines liability."' The government in applying
the local law makes an important concession. Since in the allowance of claims
against the government it has been firmly established that contributory negligence on the part of the claimant defeats his claims brought under the Domestic
Claims Act, the army, as a matter of policy, refuses to assert any claim in
which the negligence of militarr personnel was a contributing cause to the
damage or injury, even though the jurisdiction is one that applies the doctrine
of last clear chance or comparative negligence.
'This regulation supersedes Army Regulation 25-220, dated 3 July 1943.
9 5 U.S.C. 751-798.
"In a case -wherein certain town ordinances required the giving of notice to the
municipality within thirty days from the date bf damage caused by negligence of agents
of the municipality, it was held that such ordinances were binding on the Government
in a tort asserted by the Government against the municipality. Digest of Opinions of
the Judge Advocate General: Dig. Op. JAG 1912-40, page 910.
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In the event the government institutes suit for damages it does so in the
capacity of any other private litigant and waives any immunity as a sovereign.
The defendant may therefore interpose any defense, including a counterclaim.
In such cases the question of contributory negligence, or any other question,
is for the determination of the court."
Suits or claims by the government are not barred by ordinary statutes
of limitation or by laches, unless the Congress has clearly indicated an intent
that the government be barred by enacting legislation so providing. No such
legislation has been enacted applicable to claims under Army Regulations
25-220.
The laws in the different jurisdictions are fairly uniform as to the elements recoverable for damage to real or personal property. However, with
respect to the provision of the regulation under which the government asserts
a right to recover for loss of services of its military personnel, and for expenses
incident to their injury or death, serious questions may arise. The only direct
authority available on this troublesome question is a case decided in the District Court of the United States, Southern District of California, Central
Division. The case considered by that court was United States vs. Standard
Oil Company of California.12 The question for determination was whether
or not the United States has the right to recover for hospitalization and wages
paid to a soldier during the time he was incapacitated, through the tortious
act of the defendant. The court recognized that there were no precedents controlling, and in holding that the government could recover said:
"At the common law, the master could recover for loss of services resulting from a tort committed on the servant of a third person. By analogy, a
parent was given the right to recover for the loss of the services of his child,
and a husband for those of his wife. And these actions are entirely independent of the right of the servant, child, or wife to recover for the injuries themselves. When a man becomes a soldier, a status is created whether the soldier
enlisted voluntarily or is selected under a Selective Service Law. A voluntary
enlistment originates in a contract for a definite period. But any similarity
between it and other contractual relationships, such as master and servant
ceases. The essence of the relation of master and servant is the freedom of
the servant to end it, subject, of course, to responsibility of wrongful termination. * * * So the upshot of the matter is this: A special relation has been
created. Whether we call it a status, as some of the cases do, or whether we
'ust call it -Covernment and soldier relation, it is clear that both the soldier
and the Government have certain rights and obligations arising from it and
that a third party who, through his tortious act, interferes with it to the detriment of the Government, is responsible for the mischief he causes. And he
Fed. (2d)to 170.
Supp. 135;
Seed Co.,and14 isFed.
vs. Moscow
the Circuit Court.
being92 appealed
at present
ThisS.case
is not reported
"1 U.
It is Case No. 4204-Y Civil, District Court of the United States, Southern District
of California, Central Division.

DICTA

cannot avoid responsibility for his act by claiming that the relation is one for
which the common law did not have a name."
The settlement of any claim asserted by the government for injury to
military personnel does not serve to discharge any cause of action existing
in favor of the injured soldier. His right to recover for negligent or wrongful
injury to himself is a separate and distinct right from the right of the government to recover for the loss of his services or the expense incident to his care
and rehabilitation. The converse is likewise true. 13
Claims in behalf of the government are investigated in the same manner
and by the same personnel as those considered in Part I of this article. If it
is determined that the defendant is liable the commanding officer who appointed the claims officer refers the file to his Claims Judge Advocate. If he
concurs in the recommendation the commanding officer will make a written
demand for payment 'unless payment or an acceptable offer of compromise
has already been made. Payments in full are transmitted to the appropriate
fiscal officer.
The commanding officer has no authority to accept an offer of compromise, or to abandon the claim by reason of noncollectability.
If the demand is not met within a reasonable time the file is forwarded
to the commanding general of the service command, who in turn refers it to
his claims judge advocate. This officer will probably renew the demand. If
payment or an offer of compromise is not forthcoming within a reasonable
time the file is forwarded to the Judge Advocate General in Washington.
The commanding general of the service command may abandon the case by
reason of the amount involved or for any other special circumstance. He also
closes the case if the defendant is not liable.
All cases requiring suit, or settlement by reason of an offer of compromise, must be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General. There they are
reviewed and sent to the Secretary of War for transmittal to the Attorney
General. The Attorney General, by virtue of his office, prosecutes the suit
in the event such action is necessary. He, and he alone, has authority to accept
an offer of compromise. Of course, the practical work of the Attorney General is done by the various United States District Attorneys. Acting in behalf
of the Attorney General they have full discretion in prosecuting or dismissing the case, or in effectuating a compromise.
The practical effect of the outlined procedure is that only a small percentage of the potential claims are actually tried. A considerable portion are
compromised in Washington through the cooperation of insurance carriers,
the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General. Many are abandoned,
particularly when the damage to the government is not substantial. Many
" "The Government is not concerned with any settlement between the soldier and
a third person. . . . Any such settlement would not affect the Government's right to
proceed against the third person for all the hospital costs and pay of the soldier

injured."

Bulletin Judge Advocate General, April 1943, page 155.
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are discontinued because of practical difficulties. Often the necessary witnesses
are military personnel who have been transferred from the scene of the
damage or injury. They are either unobtainable, or the difficulty of returning
them to the jurisdiction where the damage or injury occurred is disproportionate to the amount of the claim.
One source of annoyance to lawyers is the provision in the regulation
which prohibits the giving of a release, even though the amount of the payment is the full amount of the government's claim. The reason for this is
that under federal law the Attorney General is the only one who has authority to compromise or release any defendant, against whom the government
has a claim, from further liability. Therefore, in the event a release is insisted
upon it must be obtained, through military channels, from the Attorney General. This procedure is quite unnecessary in view of the provisions in the
regulation which empowers the claims officer, or any reviewing authority, to
give a receipt reciting that payment in full has been received by the government for the injury or damage specified. This has the same practical effect
as a release.
In conclusion the writer desires to make it clear that this article is not
all inclusive on the subject of government claims. Attention has been directed
only to War Department claims. If a problem arises involving other government agencies an investigation should be made through those agencies to
determine what remedies are provided, and to determine what rights and
obligations have been incurred. Also,' no attempt has been made to consider
contractual claims which arise against the government and which are handled
by the United States Court of Claims.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Captain Sherman
C. Wilke of the Judge Advocate Office of the Ninth Service Comand who
very kindly supplied source material and who gave valuable assistance in
editing the material contained herein.

Should We Change Our Legal
Educational System? t
By LEONARD A. WORTHINGTON

*

* Of the San Francisco Bar.

The noteworthy action by the State Bar of California in providing for
the placement, re-establishment, and education of returning lawyer veterans
is worthy of the highest commendation and brings to mind a parallel matter
that requires immediate study and attention by the lawyers and legal educa
tors of this state.
t Reprinted by permission from the Journal of the State Bar of California,
Jaf.,Feb. 1946.

